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Abstract
Truth be told, the “Y2K bug” was quite a disappointment. While the technopundits wooed us with visions of network 
failures worthy of millennial fervor, Jan. 1, 2000, came and went without even a glimmer of the catastrophic. Yet the 
Y2K “bug” did reveal the degree to which the American apocalypse now took the form of the network itself. The spaces 
of everyday life in America and elsewhere in a developed world produce and are produced by network structures that 
Manuel Castells has called “spaces of flow.” As such, Catastrophe today is marked more by dispersion and dissipation, 
rather than breakdown — a dis-strophe of social forms, structures, and experience. 
The dissipation of enactive networks does not, however, equate with a system failure. With the Internet “bubble burst” 
of March, 2000, the very exuberance of market flows were very much the conditions of possibility for both the 
irruption of a new economy and its sudden evaporation. It is not the ephemerality of these social forms and structures 
that disorients activities of everyday life in a network society, but rather our lack of control over distributed processes. 
The bubble burst, then, by no means sounded a death knell for distributed network functions. Rather, it marked a 
moment of increased misrecognition of the forms, structures, and practices that were the conditions of possibility for 
the event itself, as an ideology of authentication eclipsed a rhetoric of emergence and flow. Billions in capital 
disappeared in a matter of weeks, but the network forms and structures that allowed individual users “direct access” to 
the flows of capital remained in place for a normative virtual class, articulated as personalized and privatized spaces of 
control. 
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Truth be told, the “Y2K bug” was quite a disappointment. While the technopundits wooed us 
with visions of network failures worthy of millennial fervor, Jan. 1, 2000, came and went 
without even a glimmer of the catastrophic. Yet the Y2K “bug” did reveal the degree to which 
the American apocalypse now took the form of the network itself. The spaces of everyday life in 
America and elsewhere in a developed world produce and are produced by network structures 
that Manuel Castells has called “spaces of flow.” As such, Catastrophe today is marked more by 
dispersion and dissipation, rather than breakdown — a dis-strophe of social forms, structures, 
and experience. 
The dissipation of enactive networks does not, however, equate with a system failure. With the 
Internet “bubble burst” of March, 2000, the very exuberance of market flows were very much the 
conditions of possibility for both the irruption of a new economy and its sudden evaporation. It is 
not the ephemerality of these social forms and structures that disorients activities of everyday life 
in a network society, but rather our lack of control over distributed processes. The bubble burst, 
then, by no means sounded a death knell for distributed network functions. Rather, it marked a 
moment of increased misrecognition of the forms, structures, and practices that were the 
conditions of possibility for the event itself, as an ideology of authentication eclipsed a rhetoric 
of emergence and flow. Billions in capital disappeared in a matter of weeks, but the network 
forms and structures that allowed individual users “direct access” to the flows of capital 
remained in place for a normative virtual class, articulated as personalized and privatized spaces 
of control.  
As the bubble burst signaled an instance of digital dis-strophe, the 9/11 attacks on the World 
Trade Center marked a similar dissipative moment, articulated in the material terror of over 
1,300 feet of skyscraper steel and human bodies turned to wreckage and dust. Much as the 
market crash of 2000 represented a collapse from within of the same network processes that 
enabled the market’s phenomenal growth, for all the “foreignness” of the terrorists, al Qaeda as 
an organization appeared decidedly at home in the globalized network society that it threatened 
to destroy. In an instance of Baudrillardian “ironic revenge,” terrorism appropriated all the 
trappings of a global space of flows in the name of subverting that same social structure 
(Baudrillard, “Spirit” 17-19). Only within the conditions of possibility of networked social space 
could such attacks occur. As such, terrorist cells functioned (the media informed us) as nodes in 
a distributed network, a human articulation of a space of flows capable of enacting horrifying 
acts beyond control. 
While in the years leading up to the market collapse of March, 2000, a growing number of an 
emerging virtual middle class (from cyberhippy to day-trader manqué) began to understand 
distributed networks as material expressions of a social revolution, the image of a distributed 
network changed after 9/11, becoming a global spatiality of fear and danger. As independent 
scholar Sam Smith notes on his weblog: 
I expect the organizing principle of the coming age – the era that began on September 12… – 
will be the distributed network, and we already have some early indications of what this period 
might look like. The decentralized potency of the Internet is a perfect metaphor in so many ways, 
and al Qaeda itself provides an apt demonstration of the character and power of the distributed 
network…. As our ill-prepared military has discovered, it’s hard to kill something you can’t find. 
Thank goodness for the Taliban, eh? 
Although figured as an anti-modern fundamentalism, the terrorist networks associated with 
September 11 served as an image of contemporary network structures themselves. The enemy, it 
seemed, was not some reclusive figurehead, but rather, the spatiality of the network itself, 
enacted by distributed, autonomous agents. Carl Conetta, writing on the nature of al Qaeda as a 
distributed network, notes in particular its ability to “[link] subnational elements together in a 
transnational web,” to thrive in nation-states that have collapsed or are about to collapse; in 
short, al Qaeda “lives in the interstices” of modern global space (Conetta). As globalization’s 
ironic revenge, distributed terror maps the interstitial flows that exploit the inability of 
centralized authority to coordinate emergent, enactive forms of network agency.  
In response, the US Congress passed the Patriot Act as an attempt to introduce modes of control 
into distributed networks and place them at the fingertips of state-based agencies. In an era of 
global flows, the Patriot Act reestablished the homeland as both a concept of social space and a 
delimited space of practice, articulated through global network structures. As part of President 
Bush’s “war on terror,” the Patriot Act declared war on the dispersive and dissipative nature of 
distributed networks by introducing what Deleuze and Guattari would call state-based 
apparatuses of capture. But as Deleuze notes, in a world of flows, “capture” occurs as a 
modulation, not an enclosure — a system of distributed control that is itself expressed in flows 
(4). The Patriot Act acknowledges networks themselves as modes of agency (noted in its 
frequent reference to an “intelligence service or network of a foreign power”), and as such 
institutes a legislative structure to “trap and trace” emergent network structures. In effect, the 
Patriot Act marks a modulation of networked social space that affirms the primacy of global 
flows in contemporary life at the same time that it initiates state-based systems of distributed 
control.  
Apparatuses of capture modulate flows by eliminating the interstitial and regulating transmission 
as a mode of order. The “homeland security” measures, then, are precisely this sort of effort to 
modulate the forms, structures, and practices of a space of flows. As the US military force 
mounted, one heard less and less talk of the distributed network form of terror, as an 
uncontrollable threat coalesced in the modulated image of a handful of figureheads: a “line up” 
in its most literal sense connecting bin Laden, Zakawi, and Hussein. The infamous Most Wanted 
card deck shifted our imagination from the shuffling networks of global terror to a linear ranking 
of Ba’ath Party players — a chain of command in a “rogue nation,” from ace of spades to the 
two of clubs. The topology of fear had changed. Within months, the U.S. government’s rhetoric 
had swayed our attention from terrorist networks to an “Axis of Evil.” Gone were the references 
to the complex webbings of distributed systems, and in its place, the reassuringly linear, 
gravitational orientations of good and evil. The “axis” not only revived the relatively clear lines 
of geopolitics of the Second World War; it also attempted to reestablish a representation of space 
predicated upon unidirectional movements and centralized control. 
Meanwhile, back in the homeland, DARPA’s Total Information Awareness (TIA) Program 
(renamed the Terrorist Information Awareness Program for better PR) promised a means of 
capturing flows of information through distributed control over the network. Whereas terrorist 
organizations exploit the interstitial spaces of a global network society, TIA as a state-based 
apparatus of capture promised to utilize these same networks to modulate a space of flows and 
extract orderly patterns of information. The agent of the state doesn’t necessarily control the flow 
of these networks, but rather, extracts mappings of emergent connections enacted by the network 
itself. Patterns of informatic exchange and transmission, then, provide distributed control over a 
network environment that can only be defined by flows and virtualities.  
In contrast to the data mining we are all used to in a commercial setting, where patterns of 
aggregate data give rise to “meaningful” market analysis, distributed control systems would 
instead focus on “rare but significant connections” mapped by the relational structures of a 
situated subject (DARPA A-14). Lines of contact emerge as pattern recognition allows 
authorized agents to “connect the dots” (a favored expression throughout DARPA’s report to 
Congress) within an undifferentiated network of data-flow. Distributed control creates a means 
for modulating what would otherwise appear as abject noise or aberrant links; the very fact that 
terrorist networks are represented as abject, interstitial social formations (and vice versa) 
becomes the condition of possibility for their recognition and capture.  
In a world in which networks of flows shape both state structures of power and the attempts to 
destroy those same structures, the lines have been drawn — and modulated. Through systems of 
distributed control, enactive networks now increasingly speak to a social space in which agency 
itself maps an emergent network. Less than two years after the Patriot Act was signed into law, 
DARPA lost Congressional funding for TIA. Again, it was the potential for success that induced 
our visions of digital catastrophe — that such a large body of data subjected to distributed 
control presented the potential for the network’s ironic revenge. Yet in many ways the modes of 
distributed control enacted by networks of pattern recognition are already matters of everyday 
life, misrecognized as “conveniences” in a network society. While spam filters and software 
agents hardly equate with the sophistication of TIA programs, the goal of each is the same — to 
modulate flows and cast off or capture the interstitial within programs of order. While 
information may want to be free, the forms, structures, and practices of everyday life reveal the 
degree to which a normative virtual class exerts a will to control, and an ironic willingness to 
distribute that control to the network itself.  
In a post-9/11 America, distributed controls are all the more implicated in everyday life, and all 
the more misrecognized as such by a citizenry terrified by middle eastern networks and placated 
by lines in the sand. 
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